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1 Introduction
The acquisition by a firm in the supply chain of a share in the capital of another firm is
relatively common. Whilst falling short of a full vertical integration, such partial vertical in-
tegrations may (i) help “...align the interests of the target and acquirer, reducing transaction
costs or encouraging non-contractible effort or specific investment”(Greenlee and Raskovich,
2006, p. 1018), (ii) facilitate cooperation when contracts are incomplete (Allen and Phillips,
2000; Fee et al., 2006) and (iii) contribute to a reduction in the double marginalization prob-
lem.1 The latter explanation is particularly relevant for competition policy: vertical mergers
of firms with market power typically attract scrutiny from competition authorities because
of the potential for input foreclosure, whereby the (now) vertically integrated firm constrains
access to an input it produces to its (non-integrated) rivals in a downstream segment.2 How-
ever, as it is well known in the literature (e.g., Motta, 2004), the effi ciency features of vertical
mergers, namely the potential to reduce the double marginalization problem, typically make
them less worrisome than their horizontal counterparts.3
Such acquisitions may materialise through competitive bid offerings or a private place-
ments (Smith, 1986).4 Empirical results show that competitive bid offerings yield lower
flotation costs than private placements, and yet most firms which are not obliged to pro-
ceed otherwise prefer the latter (Smith, 1986; Cronquist and Nilsson, 2005).5 As Wu (2004)
notes, (i) high information asymmetries (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999) and (ii) the need
to enhance the monitoring of managers typically work in favour of private placements (as
opposed to IPO), although the latter appears to lack empirical support (Hertzel and Smith,
1993; Wu, 2004). Wu (2004) also observes that managers may be more capable of influencing
1The (relatively scarce) literature on partial vertical integrations yields results which differ somewhat from
full vertical mergers, as initially suggested by Baumol and Ordover (1994). This literature can be divided
into two categories: one in which the partial acquisition gives the acquiring firm a controlling stake in its
target, effectively allowing it to define prices (e.g., Spiegel, 2013); and another (to which this paper belongs)
where the partial acquisition gives the acquirer a non-controlling stake in the target’s capital, which, thus,
does not allow it to influence the target’s decisions (e.g., Greenlee and Raskovich; 2006; Hunold et al., 2012).
2Rey and Tirole (2007) and Riordan (2008) provide good overviews of vertical foreclosure.
3Motta (2004, p. 378) even suggests a two-step procedure for the analysis of vertical mergers: in the
first step, competition authorities should analyse whether the merger will lead to input foreclosure (thus
harming competitors); if the answer is positive, a second step would be to establish whether final consumer
prices are likely to increase (harm to competition). In essence, authorities should weigh the anti-competitive
(input foreclosure) and pro-competitive (elimination of double marginalization and consequent final price
reductions) effects of vertical mergers.
4Competitive bid offerings include initial public offerings (IPO) as well as share issues (depending on
whether a firm is already listed or not).
5In particular, Smith (1986) points out that, in the US, public utility firms are obliged to sell securities
through competitive bids, unless they obtain an exemption from the SEC.
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the ownership structure through private placements, as their preferences can steer the search
for investors. If that is the case, managers may be more inclined to conduct such partial
integrations through private placements.
This paper weds these two strands of the literature by analysing a backward partial
vertical integration - whereby downstream firms acquire a non-controlling share in the capital
of an upstream firm - through a private placement operation. This is both a frequent
and interesting phenomenon: Wu (2004) finds that 15% of private placement investors are
‘strategic alliance partners’, including suppliers, customers and strategic partners. Fee et
al. (2006) find that partial equity stakes are more likely along the supply chain when firms
are involved in formal alliance agreements and Allen and Phillips (2000) find that such
acquisitions generate excess returns. In particular, Allen and Phillips (2000) find that private
placements involving firms with a strategic product market relationship attract a premium
(and lead to increased operating cash flows), in stark contrast with the discount generally
associated with private placements (see Finnerty, 2013); moreover, Cronquist and Nilsson
(2005) find empirical evidence suggesting that firms which have a strategic alliance are more
likely to issue equity to their business partners through a private placement.
The underlying supply chain setup shares features of Greenlee and Raskovich (2006) -
a single upstream supplier and competition in the downstream segment - and of Hunold et
al. (2012) - who allow for upstream price discrimination. In particular, we assume that
downstream firms compete on quantity (Cournot) and the upstream monopolist chooses
(possibly discriminatory) linear wholesale prices which differ across two groups of retail
firms: one which contains the retail firms with a non-controlling stake in the upstream
firm’s capital and another which contains its rivals in the downstream segment. These are
the two key distinctions from Greenlee and Raskovich’s (2006) setup: we allow a subset
(and not all) retail firms to acquire a share in the upstream firm’s capital and we assume
that the upstream firm can charge linear and discriminatory wholesale prices. Under this
setup, we then analyse the potential profitability of a backward partial integration through a
private placement operation, with the help of a financial intermediary.6 We are particularly
interested in understanding the rationale underlying such a financial intermediary’s choice
of the number of retail firms to approach in the operation. To the best of our knowledge,
this is one of the first papers to look at the optimal characteristics of private placements.
Under backward partial vertical integration, we find that (i) the upstream firm finds it
6Sjostrom (2013) notes that issuing companies often use investment banks as placement agents, whose
role is to seek interested investors, and which play an important monitoring role of the issuing firm because
of informational asymmetries between managers and potential capital acquirers (Smith, 1986).
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profit-maximizing to price discriminate between retail firms, charging a higher wholesale
price to the retail firms which own a non-controlling stake in its capital; (ii) compared to a
scenario of vertical separation (where the partial integration does not occur), there is input
foreclosure and the final retail price is higher;7 (iii) the partial integration has a detrimental
effect on social welfare but (iv) is profitable.8 Results (i), (ii) and (iii) are similar to those
obtained by Hunold et al. (2012). However, contrary to result (iv), they find that backward
partial integration is only desirable if upstream competition is suffi ciently intense.9 ,10
We explore two different motivations underlying the private placement: a ‘benevolent’
motivation, which seeks to maximize gains from trade, and a ‘self-interest’motivation, which
aims to maximize the upstream firm’s post-integration profits. Result (v) shows that private
placement operations ‘benevolently’motivated involve more retail firms than those moti-
vated by self-interest. In addition, although we are unable to find closed-form solutions for
the former, our numerical solutions yield interesting insights: the number of retail firms ap-
proached to take part in a private placement operation is increasing both with retail market
size and the overall share in the upstream’s firm capital that would be sold.
Result (i) appears, at first glance, counterintuitive, as one would expect the upstream
firm, if allowed to price discriminate, to favour the retail firms which have acquired a share
in its capital.11 Not surprisingly, this occurs in equilibrium, but in a subtle way: the capital
stake held by a subset of retail firms works as a rebate to the wholesale price they face.
This, in turn, induces them to expand production (‘output expansion effect’) and, thus,
their demand for the upstream input. The upstream firm takes advantage of this increased
7Input foreclosure occurs insofar as the wholesale prices charged under partial vertical integration are
higher than under vertical separation. Salinger (1988, pp. 352-353) suggests that an increase in the wholesale
price is “...an economically meaningful definition of market foreclosure of downstream firms”.
8That is, there are gains from trade in the acquisition of a strictly positive share of the upstream firm’s
capital by a subset of retail firms.
9Hunold et al. (2012), Proposition 2. Their result is explained by a Bertrand-competing duopoly as-
sumption in the downstream segment (which contrasts with our N -firm Cournot competition assumption).
10The live music industry - for which, as we argue below, our model appears to be a good depiction - has
several examples of (various degrees) of vertical integration (partial equity interest, lease, booking rights or
ownership). For instance, AEG Live is the live-entertainment division of the Anschutz Entertainment Group
(AEG), which promotes live music and entertainment events; over time, AEG has acquired or leased several
venues, such as the O2 arena, Wembley Arena and Hammersmith Apollo (London, UK) (the latter two have
been assessed and cleared by the OFT and Competition Comission). Live Nation Entertainment is also a
promoter of live music events and has also been active in the acquisition (full or partial) or lease of venues
(139 as of 2012), especially in the US and UK. Notably, Live Nation current holds both a long-term lease
and a shareholding of the Ziggo Dome (Amsterdam). In Portugal, the MEO Arena (Lisbon) was acquired,
in 2012, by a firm whose shareholders include two live music event promoters.
11A full vertical merger would typically yield such a result: the upstream firm would charge a wholesale
price equal to marginal cost to its (now) downstream subsidiary and (possibly) choose to constrain input
access to its rivals (Motta, 2004, p. 375; Inderst and Valletti, 2011).
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demand and finds it profit-maximizing to charge those firms a higher ‘gross’wholesale price
than that which it charges their rivals, but in ‘net’terms (i.e., once the share of the upstream
firm’s profits are considered), the wholesale price is effectively lower, as one would expect.
Results (ii) and (iii) convey interesting competition policy implications: the output ex-
pansion effect of the upstream firm’s non-controlling shareholders comes together with input
foreclosure to their retail rivals, and the latter is the dominant effect, which leads to a lower
total quantity, a higher final retail price and lower social welfare. This result - similar to
that obtained by Hunold et al. (2012) - is clearly different from Greenlee and Raskovich
(2006).12 Interestingly, this result also differs somewhat from that of Höffl er and Kranz
(2011) in their comparison of vertical separation with ‘legal unbundling’- a situation where
a downstream firm fully owns the upstream firm, but cannot (for legal or regulatory rea-
sons) make upstream price or non-price decisions.13 They find that, under legal unbundling,
although the vertically integrated downstream firm has incentives to expand its output and
their downstream rivals reduce their output (under quantity competition), the net effect on
total quantity (‘downstream expansion effect’) is positive (whereas in our case it is nega-
tive).14 Therefore, a policy implication of our results is that competition authorities should
analyse such partial vertical integrations with particular concern and, if possible, constrain
the upstream firm’s ability (post-acquisition) to price discriminate.
Result (iv) has two relevant implications: first, it justifies the role of a financial inter-
mediary in a private placement operation; second, it is an example of a private placement
operation which would justify a premium (rather than a discount), which is consistent with
Allen and Phillips’s (2000) results when strategic partners are involved. Finally, result (v)
contains interesting and relevant insights, naturally related with results (i)-(iv). For a given
non-controlling share of the upstream firm’s capital to be sold, if self-interest is the pri-
mary motivation of the private placement, it is optimal to restrict it to a single investor; by
contrast, if the objective is to maximize gains from trade, a financial intermediary finds it
12In Greenlee and Raskovich (2006), the upstream firm also faces increased input demand when retail
firms acquire partial stakes in its capital and, thus, raises wholesale prices. But these two effects cancel out
under linear and uniform wholesale prices, and total output and final consumer prices remain unaffected.
13In Höffl er and Kranz (2011), the upstream firm can choose non-tariff ‘sabotage’strategies against other
downstream firms, i.e., non-price discrimination is allowed.
14The intuition underlying the difference in results is relatively straightforward: in Höffl er and Kranz
(2011), the optimal ‘sabotage’strategy is similar in the legal unbundling and vertical separation scenarios,
because it does not affect the upstream firm’s profits directly (only indirectly, through its impact on total
quantity sold), i.e., the upstream firm maximizes profits by maximizing total output (and, thus, by not
sabotaging other downstream firms). By contrast, in our case, the upstream firm’s discrimination tool is
price-based and affects its profits directly. In this situation, the upstream firm finds it optimal to implement
price discrimination, as it trades-off a lower overall quantity sold with a higher profit margin on each unit.
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optimal not to be that restrictive. In particular, depending on the retail market size and the
magnitude of the non-controlling share in the upstream firm, the optimal number of retail
firms involved is at least one but it is never optimal to approach all retail firms. Underlying
this result is the balance of the output expansion effect for a subset of retail firms with the
inevitable output contraction (because of input foreclosure) of their rivals.
The paper is structured in the following way: section 2 describes the model; section 3
contains the main results and section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We assume a supply chain with an upstream segment, where only one firm - firm U - is
assumed to operate, producing an essential input for all firms in the downstream or retail
segment, where N firms compete to produce a (homogeneous) final good for consumers. The
underlying production process we assume is relatively simple and consists of a one-to-one
fixed proportions technology. Firm U, which we assume not to have any production costs,
produces an input which retail firms acquire and somehow ‘transform’or ‘convert’ into a
retail product (which, thus, also implies a retail cost on top of the input purchase costs).
Two examples can be given of such simple processes. In the telecommunications sec-
tor, retail firms which do not possess a telecommunications network can typically purchase
wholesale services from the incumbent and this allows them to sell services directly to con-
sumers.15 In the music industry, promoters organize music concerts by essentially securing
deals with musicians and booking a venue for the show.16 For concerts which attract signif-
icant demand (e.g., well-known musicians in world tours), there is typically a relatively low
number of large capacity venues in each country, which promoters can book in order to sell
tickets for a particular concert.17 ,18
Therefore each downstream firm i ∈ {1, ..., N} is assumed to have two elements in its
15For instance, through local loop unbundling, retail firms can purchase from the incumbent wholesale
access to local loops and thus sell directly to consumers a variety of services, such as broadband internet or
voice calls. Naturally, on top of the wholesale access costs, retail firms then incur a variety of retail costs
(e.g., billing, service maintenance, complaints, etc.).
16Therefore, on top of the venue’s rental costs, promoters must pay musicians, as well as support a variety
of marketing costs (namely advertising).
17In the case of music concerts, the quantity variable could be interpreted as the number of concerts. For
instance, firm U, by renting out its venue for, say, a 3-day block (one day to set up the stage, the concert
day, and another day to pack all the material), is effectively allowing a downstream firm to promote one
concert. The inverse demand function would thus provide an overall (by all consumers) willingness to pay
for a concert, which is inversely related to the number of concerts promoted by downstream firms.
18Examples of venues with over 15,000 seats are the O2 arena in London, the Manchester Arena in
Manchester, the Bercy Arena in Paris or the Lanxess Arena in Cologne.
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cost function: first, the cost associated with the purchase of the essential input from firm U ;
second, a constant marginal cost of c. Inverse consumer demand is assumed to be linear and
given by p = a−
N∑
i=1
qi, with a > c.
The scenario we explore in this paper is one where K ≤ N retail firms acquire a sym-
metric non-controlling share α ∈ (0, 1) in firm U’s capital. We are particularly interested
in symmetric (within K firms) share ownerships and thus assume that α = Ω/K, where
Ω is the total share of firm U’s capital acquired by retail firms. Of critical importance to
our analysis is the assumption that the share in firm U’s capital does not give any retail
firm control over firm U - particularly, it does not give them control over wholesale prices.
Therefore, the acquisition by K retail firms of a share α in firm U’s capital can be seen as a
passive ownership which involves pure cash flow rights - the expectation to receive a share of
firm U’s profits. This setup is similar to that of Greenlee and Raskovich (2006), but differs
from it in two important aspects. First, Greenlee and Raskovich (2006) only consider the
acquisition of a share in firm U’s capital by all retail firms, whilst we allow only a subset of
K firms to do so; second, we allow firm U to price discriminate (in linear prices) between two
groups of retail firms: its K non-controlling shareholders and their (N −K) retail rivals.19
Therefore, we assume that firm U sets a wholesale price wK applicable to each of K retail
firms and a (possibly different) wholesale price w̄ for all other retail firms. Greenlee and
Raskovich (2006), by contrast, assume that firm U sets a linear and uniform wholesale price.
Decisions are assumed to be sequential in a three-stage game: in the second stage, firm
U sets the wholesale price for the essential input and in the third stage retail firms observe
the wholesale price and choose the quantity they provide to final consumers (Cournot com-
petition). In the first stage, a financial intermediary assesses the potential profitability of a
backward partial vertical integration and, conditional on the willingness of firm U to sell a
share Ω of its capital, decides how many K firms to approach in a private placement.
3 Equilibrium results
3.1 Price and quantity choices (second and third stages)
The subgame-perfect equilibrium is obtained by backward induction. In the third stage of











qj− w̄qj−cqj, where w̄ is the wholesale price they face.
19Hunold et al. (2012) also allow for price discrimination to occur at the upstream level.
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qk − w̄ − c
1 +N −K , ∀j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} (1)
Each retail firm k ∈ {1, ..., K} (denoted ‘kI’to highlight that its profits are now those of
a backward partially integrated firm) also chooses a quantity qk which maximizes its profits





















where the latter term represents the share of firm U’s profits received by each firm k. Sym-





qj − wK − c+ αwK
K + 1
(2)
As it is standard in Cournot settings, we have strategic substitutability. In a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, we have:
qk =
a− (1 +N −K) (1− α)wK + (N −K)w̄ − c
N + 1
, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K} (3)
qj =
a+K (1− α)wK − (K + 1) w̄ − c
N + 1
, ∀j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} (4)
In the second stage of the game, firm U in the upstream segment chooses wholesale prices






qj. In equilibrium, we obtain:
w∗K =
(2N − αN + 2 + αK) (a− c)
4N − 4αN + 4− 4α− α2NK + α2K2 (5)
w̄∗ =
(2N − 2αN + 2− 2α + αK) (a− c)
4N − 4αN + 4− 4α− α2NK + α2K2 (6)
Faced with these equilibrium wholesale prices, downstream firms will produce:
q∗k =
(1− α) (αN − αK + 2) (a− c)
4N − 4αN + 4− 4α− α2NK + α2K2 , ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K} (7)
q∗j =
(2− 2α− αK) (a− c)
4N − 4αN + 4− 4α− α2NK + α2K2 , ∀j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} (8)
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and the equilibrium retail price is p∗ = a−Q∗.
Parameter restrictions: We focus on interior solutions in which all downstream firms
are active. Two restrictions ensure that all retail quantities produced are strictly positive.
First, for firms k ∈ {1, ..., K} , in order for q∗k > 0, 4N − 4αN + 4− 4α−α2NK +α2K2 > 0,




for firms j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} , in order for q∗j > 0, in addition to the previous restriction we
must have that (2− 2α− αK) > 0, which is equivalent to requiring that α < 2
2+K
. This
second restriction is more stringent than the first, and hence provided α < 2
2+K
, both q∗k and
q∗j (∀k ∈ {1, ..., K} , ∀j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N}) are always positive.21
With this setup, we obtain the following results:
Proposition 1 Provided α < 2
2+K
, it is profit-maximizing for firm U to price discriminate
between retail firms: w̄∗ < w∗K.
Proof. From equations (5) and (6) we obtain w∗K−w̄∗ =
(a−c)(2+N)α
4N−4αN+4−4α−α2NK+α2K2 , which
is positive when α < 2
2+K
.
By acquiring a share α of firm U’s capital, the profit function of each firm k ∈ {1, ..., K}
becomes different from that of firms j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} . In particular, each firm k effectively
receives a ‘rebate’or ‘discount’in the wholesale price it pays firm U for each unit it produces.
This is equivalent to saying that each firm k’s marginal cost becomes, in effect, lower than
that of firms j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} . As is standard in a Cournot setting with asymmetric
costs, this induces firm K to expand its production compared to its (N −K) competitors
(‘output expansion effect’). Firm U , however, when deciding which wholesale prices to set,
takes this asymmetry into account and, because it defines prices independently, finds it
profit-maximizing to extract rent from the K retail firms with higher input demands, thus
charging them a higher wholesale price and effectively moderating their incentive to expand
production (which, in any case, occurs in equilibrium). At a first glance, it appears almost
counterintuitive that firm U discriminates against its new shareholders - the K retail firms
-, but it is crucial to understand that firm U sets (wholesale) prices in an independent and
20The numerator of q∗k is always positive because a > c by definition.
21A more detailed analysis of the implications of this parameter restriction would certainly be very inter-
esting, although we do not pursue it. In general across jurisdictions, a majority shareholding (51 per cent) is
suffi cient to ensure corporate control. Therefore, this parameter restriction suggests that whenever K ≥ 2,
the acquisition by K firms of a shareholding in firm U’s capital entails an individual shareholding of α ≤ 0.5,
consistent with it being a non-controlling shareholding and with the interior solutions we are interested in.
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profit-maximizing manner. Also, although w̄∗ < w∗K in equilibrium, the ‘net’or ‘effective’
input price paid by each firm k ∈ {1, ..., K} (because of their α-share in firm U’s capital)
is (1− α)w∗K < w̄∗, which explains why, in equilibrium, K firms choose higher production
levels than their retail competitors.22
The asymmetry in wholesale prices depends on N, K and α. First, both wholesale prices
decrease with N but |∂w∗K/∂N | > |∂w̄∗/∂N | .23 As is standard with Cournot competition,
an increase in the number of firms at the retail level reduces the individual quantity each
firm produces (although it increases the overall quantity produced). In turn, this induces
firm U to reduce both wholesale prices, although it is profit-maximizing to reduce w∗K more
than w̄∗ (thus reducing the asymmetry between wholesale prices) because firm k’s production
(k ∈ {1, ..., K}) decreases more than that of its rivals when the number of firms increases.
Second, an increase in K increases both wholesale prices, but ∂w∗K/∂K > ∂w̄
∗/∂K when
K < N/2 (increased asymmetry as K increases) and ∂w∗K/∂K < ∂w̄
∗/∂K when K > N/2
(decreased asymmetry as K increases).24 Increased wholesale prices following an increase in
K imply a real increase in K firms’input costs, which induces them to reduce the individual
quantity produced (q∗k); however, the overall quantity produced by these K firms increases
(because K increases) and this leads firm U to increase the wholesale price it charges them.
Strategic substitutability explains why the wholesale price charged to other firms increases
as well: the higher wholesale price charged to K firms effectively reduces their input demand
and, thus, increases that of their rivals. When K is low, the aggregate output expansion
of these K firms is very significant (compared to the aggregate output reduction of N −K
firms) and firm U finds it profit maximizing to increase the asymmetry in wholesale prices.25
Third, an increase in α increases both wholesale prices, but |∂w∗K/∂α| > |∂w̄∗/∂α| .26 An
increase in α, from firms k ∈ {1, ..., K} perspective, increases the ‘rebate’they benefit from
and this further induces them to expand production. In this context, firm U finds it profit-
maximizing to further increase the wholesale price it charges them. Strategic substitutability
explains why firm U is able to also charge a higher wholesale price to other firms, although





4N−4αN+4−4α−α2NK+α2K2 for α < 2/ (2 +K) .







(4N−4αN+4−4α−α2NK+α2K2)2 , which is negative for
α < 22+K .







(4N−4αN+4−4α−α2NK+α2K2)2 , which is positive
when K < N/2 and negative otherwise.
25In equilibrium, when K < N/2, the wholesale price increase effectively moderates the K firms’output
expansion and leads to ∂Q∗/∂K < 0; by contrast, when K > N/2, ∂Q∗/∂K > 0.









this increase is lower than that in firms’k ∈ {1, ..., K} wholesale price.
Of particular interest from a competition policy perspective is a comparison between
a scenario where a partial vertical integration occurs and an alternative scenario where it
does not (vertical separation). In the latter, firm U sets a uniform wholesale price wV S
(‘VS’stands for vertical separation) and N firms compete on quantities in the downstream
segment.27 This is equivalent to setting α = 0 in our model. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 Provided α < 2
2+K
, and in comparison to a vertical separation scenario,
backward partial vertical integration with price discrimination leads to input foreclosure and






k, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K} , ∀j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} ,
∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, QV S > Q∗ and, consequently, pV S < p∗.
Proof. In a vertical separation scenario, wV S = (a− c) /2 (readily obtained by substitut-
ing α = 0 in equations (5) or (6)). We thus obtain wV S−w̄∗ = − αK[2+α(N−K)](a−c)
2(4N−4αN+4−4α−α2NK+α2K2) <
0 if α < 2
2+K
. Similarly, under vertical separation, qV Sk = q
V S
j = q
V S = a−c
2(N+1)
, ∀k ∈
{1, ..., K} , ∀j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} (obtained by substituting α = 0 in equations (7) or (8)).
From this expression, we obtain:
qV S − q∗k =
α (N −K) [−2N (1− α)− 2 + α (2−K)] (a− c)




because the numerator is always negative and the denominator is positive provided α <
2
2+K
. We also obtain:
qV S − q∗j =
αK [(2− α)N + 2 + αK] (a− c)




because the numerator is always positive and the denominator is positive provided α <
2
2+K
. Under vertical separation, we obtain QV S = N(a−c)
2(N+1)
which then yields:
QV S −Q∗ = α
2K (N + 2) (N −K) (a− c)




as the numerator is always positive and the denominator is positive provided α < 2
2+K
.
Finally, pV S = a−QV S whilst p∗ = a−Q∗. Because QV S > Q∗. we have pV S < p∗.
27Note that under vertical separation, firm U’s finds it profit-maximizing not to price discriminate, that
is, to charge a uniform wholesale price, wV S , to all retail firms.
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As outlined above, the main rationale for this result originates in K firms’output ex-
pansion effect. Firm U sets prices independently from its K non-controlling shareholders
and finds it profit maximizing to charge these K firms a higher wholesale price than that
charged to their retail rivals. However, both are higher than the wholesale price charged
under vertical separation, thus leading to input foreclosure. In equilibrium, these K firms
produce more than they would under vertical separation, whilst their rival firms produce
less. The former has a lower magnitude than the latter and hence partial vertical integration
reduces the overall quantity produced and leads to higher retail prices. Hunold et al. (2012)
obtain a similar result to this one: backward partial vertical integrations clearly appear to
have anti-competitive effects. Not surprisingly, from a social welfare viewpoint, we find that:
Proposition 3 Provided α < 2
2+K
, backward partial integration is detrimental to social
welfare (compared to vertical separation).
Proof. Social welfare is given by: SW = CS + Π, where CS denotes consumer surplus
















(α2K2 − 2αN − α2NK + 2N)2 (a− c)2
2 (4N − 4αN + 4− 4α− α2NK + α2K2)2
(12)
Total industry profits are given by:








2 (1− α) (N + 2) (α2K2 − 2αN − α2NK + 2N) (a− c)2
(4N − 4αN + 4− 4α− α2NK + α2K2)2
(13)
Social welfare thus becomes equal to:
SW = CS + Π
=
(α2K2 − 2αN − α2NK + 2N) (α2K2 − α2NK − 6αN + 6N + 8− 8α) (a− c)2
2 (4N − 4αN + 4− 4α− α2NK + α2K2)2
(14)








4αK (1− α) (α− 2) (N −K) (N + 2)2 (a− c)2
(4N − 4αN + 4− 4α− α2NK + α2K2)3




Hence, any 0 < α < 2
2+K
leads to lower social welfare than under vertical separation.
Intuitively, this result is straightforward: compared to vertical separation, Proposition
2 shows that QV S > Q∗ and, consequently, pV S < p∗. Therefore, because backward partial
integration leads to a price increase and an overall quantity decrease, both consumer surplus
and total industry profits are necessarily lower. However, the distribution of industry profits
changes: K firms obtains higher profits and (N −K) firms obtain lower profits.
3.2 Optimal private placement
In the first stage of the game, a financial intermediary must assess the potential profitability
of a backward partial vertical integration and choose the optimal characteristics of a private
placement operation for firm U’s capital. Therefore, the natural first step is to look at the
potential gains from trade of such an operation. We follow Hunold et al. (2012) in assessing
whether backward partial integrations increase the combined profits of the upstream and
downstream (acquiring) firms. In effect, as they note, the key condition for such acquisitions
to materialize is that there are gains from trading claims on the upstream firm’s profits.
First, take the combined profits of firm U and K retail firms, given by (1− αK) π∗U +
Kπ∗kI , which is obtained when we substitute w
∗
K , w̄
∗, q∗k and q
∗
j in the profit functions of firm
U and each of the k ∈ {1, ..., K} retail firms. Note that:








Therefore, compared to a vertical separation scenario (α = 0), combined profits are higher
when α > 0, that is, regardless of the bargaining process which underlies the acquisition of
a capital share in firm U , there are potential gains from trade to be realized and, therefore,
backward partial integration is desirable (compared to vertical separation). The rationale is
straightforward and consistent with our results from Section 3.1: a share α in firm U’s capital
allows K firms to expand their production (in equilibrium) which lowers their retail-related
profits.29 However, this negative effect is more than compensated by the share they receive
of firm U’s profits: indeed, these K firms’production expansion allows firm U to increase
29Looking only at retail segment profits, the output expansion effect and the retail price increase contribute
towards increased revenues; however, the gross wholesale price increase leads to increased costs, and the latter
effect dominates.
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the wholesale prices it charges (both to these K firms and to the remaining (N −K) firms -
see Proposition 2) and, thus, to increase its profits.30 This result resembles that of Okamura
et al. (2011), who, in a forward integration setting (where the upstream firm may acquire
a share in the capital of a downstream firm), find that the acquiring firm also chooses an
aggressive strategy, trading-off the profits it loses on its sales with the increased profits
accruing from the capital share it acquires. Moreover, this result contrasts with Hunold et
al. (2012), who find that not to be the case when there is an upstream monopolist.
In addition, this contributes towards justifying the role of a financial intermediary in
the private placement, insofar as the increased combined profits may be used to cover the
cost of the operation.31 We explore two scenarios, both of which assume that the financial
intermediary acts as a perfect agent for the upstream firm. In a first scenario, we posit that
the financial intermediary maximizes gains from trade, which is equivalent to maximizing the
difference between the combined profits of firm U andK retail firms under vertical separation
and under partial vertical integration. This is somewhat equivalent to viewing the financial
intermediary as ‘benevolent’, insofar as it maximizes the overall combined profits (post-
integration) regardless of how they would be split between the upstream and downstream
acquiring firms. In this scenario, the financial intermediary’s objective function is given by:
Γ =





In a second scenario, we assume that the financial intermediary maximizes the difference
between the upstream firm’s post- and pre-integration profits (π∗U/π
V S
U ). This is somewhat
equivalent to assuming self-interest, by the upstream firm’s shareholders, in the private
placement operation, insofar as they are more concerned with their firm’s post-integration
profits than with the acquiring firms’profits. In other words, whilst in the first scenario the
way the gains from trade are split between the upstream and the acquiring downstream firms
are not considered, in this second scenario we look at one extreme split of those gains from
trade - one in which the upstream firm captures the largest possible share of those gains.
Recall that the share of capital firm U is willing to sell is Ω, and this is assumed to be an
exogenous variable.32 Firms k ∈ {1, ..., K} acquire a symmetric share α = Ω/K of firm U’s
30Although the total quantity sold in the retail market decreases with backward partial integration - see
Proposition 2 -, firm U obtains a higher profit margin on each unit sold, and the latter effect is dominant.
31We do not explore in full the trade-off between increased combined profits and the private placement’s
cost, but clearly, for any positive cost, one would find that not all backward partial integrations (namely
those where α is very close to 0) would yield net positive combined profits. This is consistent with empirical
evidence by Allen and Phillips (2000), who report a mean (median) for the fraction of equity acquired of
20% (14%) (all acquisitions).
32In effect, this can be seen as a restriction for the financial intermediary, decided by the shareholders of
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capital.33 In this context, the financial intermediary chooses K, that is, the number of firms
which will acquire a symmetric share of firm U’s capital in a private placement operation.
In the first scenario, the intermediary acts benevolently (denoted with superscript ‘b’) and
maximizes gains from trade by choosing Kb, whilst in the second scenario the intermediary
acts in the upstream firm’s self-interest (denoted with superscript ‘si’) and maximizes its
post-integration profits by choosing Ksi. We find that:
Proposition 4 Provided α < 2
2+K
⇔ Ω < 2K
2+K
, a private placement operation which max-
imizes gains from trade involves more retail firms than one which maximizes the upstream
firm’s post-integration profits, that is, Kb ≥ Ksi.




4 (N + 1) (NK −NΩ +KΩ)
N (4K − 4Ω + 4NK − 4NΩ +KΩ2 −NΩ2) (18)





= 1, that is, when Ω = 0, pre- and post-integration









4 (N + 1) (2NK + 2K +KΩ−NΩ) (NΩ−KΩ− 2K)
N (4K − 4Ω + 4NK − 4NΩ +KΩ2 −NΩ2)2
> 0 (19)
Therefore, any Ω > 0 increases post-integration upstream profits (compared to vertical








= − 4 (N + 1) (N + 2)
2 Ω2
N (4K − 4Ω + 4NK − 4NΩ +KΩ2 −NΩ2)2
< 0 (20)




Now turning our attention to the benevolent scenario, in equilibrium we obtain Γ|Ω=0 = 1









Therefore, any Ω > 0 generates gains from trade. Unfortunately, maximizing Γ (equation
(17)) with respect to K does not yield a tractable analytical solution. Therefore, we have
firm U, and is consistent with reality, insofar as a firm typically does not delegate in a financial intermediary
the decision of the total share of capital to be relinquished by shareholders.
33It is natural to think of a symmetric share allocation given that the retail segment is also symmetric.
34The expression for Γ is quite cumbersome and we have chosen not to include it here.
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focused our attention in numerical simulations of that solution for 3 possible values of N :
10, 50 and 100.35 For these three different values of N, we maximized equation (17) and
obtained the corresponding optimal value Kb, which is a function of Ω, and plotted it in
Figure 1 (left). It is now straightforward to see that Kb ≥ Ksi.36
The rationale for this result is the following: in the self-interest scenario, the upstream
firm finds it profitable to sell a share Ω > 0 of its capital. However, in order to capture as
large a share as possible of the associated gains from trade, it prefers to sell that share to
as few retail firms as possible, as it finds it more profitable to concentrate (in the smallest
possible number of firms) the output expansion effect. By contrast, when the objective is
to maximize gains from trade, it is preferable to ‘spread’the output expansion effect among
more retail firms, as their profits are also considered in Γ (equation (17)). In other words, a
‘concentrated’output expansion effect would increase the combined profits of too few retail
firms and this would not maximize the integration’s gains from trade.
Looking more closely at the results from the gains from trade scenario, we can see in
Figure 1 (left) that Kb is increasing with Ω and with N, which results in (see Figure 1
(right)) an individual share αb = Ω/Kb which is decreasing with Ω and Kb. Therefore, in a
private placement operation motivated by gains from trade, these are maximized when only
a subset of Kb < N retail firms acquire a symmetric share in firm U’s capital. The rationale
is straightforward: as suggested in Proposition 1, price discrimination incentives are retained
even when K = N, but in this case all retail firms would benefit from the output expansion
effect (associated with a lower net wholesale price). Although this would increase firm U’s
profits, increased retail competition would work in the opposite direction, thus yielding
overall industry profits equal to those obtained under vertical separation. Therefore, it is
preferable that only a subset Kb of retail firms acquire an individual share αb in firm U’s
capital. As Ω increases, the financial intermediary finds it optimal to increase Kb : indeed,
it is preferable to allocate an increased Ω to more retail firms, as this increases the aggregate
output expansion effect and, thus, overall industry profits.
Figure 2 (left) displays the optimal ‘market coverage’in the private placement operation
motivated by gains from trade, that is, the overall market share (prior to the operation)
of the Kb firms which the financial intermediary will approach. This market coverage is
increasing with Ω but decreasing with N, that is, a more competitive retail segment (with
35We have conduced simulations for more values of N, but the results are similar to those presented here.
36We have not restricted Kb or Ksi to be integers; instead, we have focused on obtaining real (equilibrium)
values for Kb or Ksi. However, introducing such an integer restriction does not change our results: in that
case, Ksi = 1 (the lowest possible positive integer) and Kb ≥ 1, for ∀N, ∀Ω ∈ (0, 1] .
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Figure 1: Optimal choice of Kb (left) and equilibrium values of αb = Ω/Kb (right)
more firms) will lead the financial intermediary to approach a subset of Kb firms which,
in aggregate, have a smaller market share. Again, this is consistent with our results. With
more competition in the retail segment (and thus lower retail profits), it is suffi cient for a
proportionally lower subset ofKb to benefit from the output expansion effect. Finally, Figure
2 (right) displays the gains from trade (Γb) which result from a private placement operation
with Kb firms. Note that these gains from trade are decreasing with N and do not appear
to follow a monotonic relationship with Ω (although it is increasing for most values of Ω).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the possibility that a subset of retail firms acquire, through
a private placement operation, a partial non-controlling interest in the capital of a key input
supplier (backward partial vertical integration), where the latter is then assumed to choose its
wholesale prices and, in particular, it is allowed to price discriminate between its (now) retail
shareholders and their competitors. We find that it is profit-maximizing for the upstream firm
to indeed price discriminate between retail firms, subtly favouring its shareholders through
a lower net wholesale price which allows them to expand production. We also find that,
compared to vertical separation, this partial vertical integration leads to input foreclosure
and ultimately to higher retail prices and lower social welfare - a result similar to that
obtained by Hunold et al. (2012). However, contrary to the latter, we find that backward
partial integration is desirable, as it increases the combined profits of the upstream and
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Figure 2: Optimal market coverage (Kb/N) (left) and gains from trade (Γb) (right)
downstream (acquiring) firms. This result also justifies the role of a financial intermediary
in a private placement operation for the sale of a share in the upstream firm’s capital. From
a competition policy viewpoint, and in comparison to the results of Greenlee and Raskovich
(2006), our analysis suggests that the possibility for price discrimination at the wholesale
level is at the root of the harm to consumers through higher retail prices and, thus, in the
analysis of such partial integrations, particular care should be taken to prevent discriminatory
pricing. From a practical viewpoint, we are able to understand the drivers underlying the
search for investors by financial intermediaries in private placement operations. In particular,
we explore two motivations underlying such operations: a benevolent motivation which seeks
to maximize gains from trade and a self-interest motivation with the objective of maximizing
the upstream firm’s post-integration profits.
Our results are amenable to empirical testing, in line with previous research by Allen
and Phillips (2000) and Fee et al. (2006). First, in sectors similar to our model setup,
backward partial integration should increase the market value of the upstream firm and of
the acquiring retail firms (because of expected higher future profits) and reduce the market
value of the remaining retail firms. Moreover, the number of retail firms involved in such
private placements may reveal their underlying motivation.
Whether these results are more general than in the particular setting we have analysed is
clearly a relevant research question. For instance, can they be generalised beyond Cournot
competition at the retail level (as in Greenlee and Raskovich, 2006) or beyond the upstream
monopoly assumption (as in Hunold et al., 2012)? How important is the form of competition
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at the retail and/or at the upstream level for these results to hold? Moreover, we assume
both a symmetric retail segment and a symmetric allocation of non-controlling stakes in the
upstream firm’s capital; how would our results change in an asymmetric environment? These
are clearly important and interesting future research questions.
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